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1. Introduction 
 
Private tutoring can be defined as a set of activities, supplementary to mainstream 
schooling, whose aim is to boost academic performance in exchange for monetary 
payment (Bray, 1999, 2006). Private tutoring can adopt a variety of forms: one-to-one 
classes, group classes or even radio or internet-based tuition. The proliferation of private 
tutoring seems to be a growing phenomenon in several countries across different 
continents (Bray and Kwo, 2014), its causes being heterogeneous (Dang, 2007; Tansel 
and Bircan, 2006). 
Private tutoring has several beneficial effects, the main one being a student’s 
enhanced academic performance. However, this so-called “shadow education” (Bray, 
1999, 2009) can also have various detrimental effects, not least the high opportunity 
cost for the students and the heavy financial burden for their families. Private tutoring 
consumption is positively correlated with household income (OECD, 2014); therefore, 
if the amount and quality of private tutoring received affect academic achievement – as 
some studies, including Choi et al. (2012), seem to suggest – then concerns are raised 
about the equity and equality of educational opportunities.  
The Republic of Korea (hereinafter, Korea) has one of the largest private tutoring 
industries in the world. The OECD (2012a: 24) reports that the burden of private 
tutoring on Korean households accounted for 10.7% of average household income per 
student in 2010 (making it also a key factor in explaining the country’s low fertility 
rates). According to the 2009 Survey of Private Education Expenditure (SPEE) 
conducted by the Korean National Statistics Office (KOSTAT), 87.4% of elementary 
school students, 74.3% of middle school students and 62.8% of general high school 
students received private tutoring in 2009, with an average monthly private tutoring 
expenditure per student of 242 thousand Korean won (approximately 220 US dollars) in 
2009. Total expenditure on private tutoring amounted to 21.626 trillion won, equivalent 
to 2% of Korea’s GDP. According to this same survey, two thirds of those who receive 
private tutoring are ‘Taking lessons at private academic institutes, called hagwon’. 
Since the 1970s, Korea has been at the front line of the design of new policies for 
tackling the proliferation of private tutoring. In 2006, in a new attempt to curb the 
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thriving private tutoring market and to revive public education, the Korean government 
decided to place a 10 p.m. curfew on the operating hours of hagwon. As a result, 
household spending on private tutoring has gradually decreased since reaching its 
highest peak in 2009. The government believes that the fall in private tutoring 
expenditure is an indication that the reforms have begun to take effect and that the 10 
p.m. curfew has played a substantial role in this (Han, 2011). However, to conclude that 
this reduction is attributable solely to the hagwon curfew may be erroneous as other 
factors, such as the sluggish real economy, could also have had an impact on the fall in 
private tutoring expenditure.  
The main aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of this new policy (i.e., the 
curfew on the academies’ operating hours) aimed at regulating private tutoring markets. 
More specifically, we focus on the effect of the curfew on private education expenditure 
and on the time dedicated to private tutoring activities. We estimate mean and 
heterogeneous effects by educational level and socioeconomic status applying 
difference-in-differences (DD) estimators to the 2009-2012 waves of the SPEE. By 
doing so, we are able to overcome many of the information problems identified by Bray 
and Kobakhidze (2014) in previous studies of private tutoring. 
The main findings of this study can be summed up as follows: First, enforcing the 
curfew did not generate a significant reduction in the hours and resources spent on 
private tutoring. Second, demand for private tutoring seems to be especially inelastic for 
high school students, who increased their consumption of alternative forms of private 
tutoring. This raises equity issues concerning equality of educational opportunities, 
given the higher cost of these alternative forms of private tutoring. Policy 
recommendations based on our analysis should be of interest not only for Korean 
authorities but also for the wide set of countries with an overheated private tutoring 
market. 
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the demand for 
and the impact of private tutoring, and charts the struggle mounted by Korean 
authorities against this phenomenon, the hagwon curfew being one of their latest 
attempts. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and the dataset employed in 
the analysis. In section 4 we present our main results concerning the impact of the 
curfew on expenditure and on the time spent on private tutoring activities. The section 
concludes with a discussion of these results and their policy implications. 
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2. Private tutoring in Korea: demand, impacts and policy evolution 
 
Korea is one of the most frequently studied cases in the private tutoring literature, due 
to the magnitude of the business and the seriousness with which successive 
governments have sought to control it. In this section we present a brief overview of the 
demand for and the impact of private tutoring (2.1), we summarize the campaign 
mounted by the Korean authorities against private tutoring (2.2) and, finally, we explain 
the curfew imposed on the hagwon (2.3). 
 
2.1. Demand for and impact of private tutoring 
 
Various factors account for the proliferation of private tutoring in Korea. Kim and 
Lee (2010) claim that parents demand private tutoring as a means of compensating for 
the poor quality of state schooling, especially because the former provides more 
individualized attention. This argument is persuasive; yet, it seems insufficient to 
explain the overheated demand for private tutoring in the country. The fact that Korean 
public education expenditure as a percentage of GDP is 4.7%, higher that is than the 
2009 OECD average of 4.0%, suggests that the relative competitiveness of public 
education may be low not because of the level of public investment, but because of the 
country’s more consumer-oriented, high quality private tutoring services (OECD, 
2012b:4). Alternatively, Bray (2006) claims that low salaries paid to mainstream 
teachers may likewise yield an increase in demand for private tutoring in some 
developing countries. However, this is not the case in Korea, where teachers are well-
paid in comparison to their counterparts in other OECD countries. 
Bray and Kwok (2003), among others, observe that the cultural history of Korea is 
another critical reason accounting for the demand for private tutoring. Many Asian 
countries, including Korea, have been highly influenced by Confucianism, a system of 
teachings in which the importance of education is emphasized as a tool for personal 
development and the primary mechanism promoting mobility (Choi, 2010, p.24).  
Finally, against this cultural backdrop, the sizeable economic and non-economic 
premiums of graduating from an elite university further shape a scenario in which the 
country is obsessed with private tutoring (Choi et al., 2012; Chae et al., 2005). Since 
1950, the Korean education system has adopted the following structure: six years of 
primary school; three years of lower secondary education; three years of upper 
4
secondary education; and four years of university studies. There are two types of high 
school: general high schools, where pupils are educated to go on to university, and 
vocational high schools. The first nine years of schooling are compulsory and free, 
while high school education is virtually universal, with only modest tuition fees being 
charged (Kim, 2004:3). According to the OECD (2011:12-13), in 2009, 98% of 25 to 
34-year-old Koreans had successfully finished high school education, while 63% of 
these had completed tertiary education: both proportions are the highest among all 
OECD countries. The percentage of high school graduates who begin four-year 
university courses or two-year technical college studies was reported to be 83.8% in 
2008, which is also very high compared to other OECD countries (KEDI, 2009:66). 
However, as the average university degree premium fell, competition for admission to 
the more prestigious universities became notoriously fiercer. As Lee and Brinton (1996) 
and Choi et al. (2012) highlight, the benefits of attending an elite university in Korea 
extend well beyond those of an individual’s human capital, as school ties provide 
additional advantages in the labor market as a crucial source of social capital. Thus, 
young students face a tremendous amount of competition for the few places offered by 
the most prestigious universities as parents are willing to adopt any strategy to help their 
children gain an upper hand over their competitors. College entrance depends primarily 
on academic achievement at school and on the results of the College Scholastic 
Achievement Test (CSAT), an objectively graded examination sat once a year. 
Consequently, Korean families end up spending considerable sums of money on private 
tutoring to support their children, a practice that is not limited solely to children from 
higher socio-economic groups, but one that is widespread across the income groups 
(Lee et al., 2014).  
The intensity with which private tutoring is consumed has both advantages and 
disadvantages. The main advantage is that pupils enhance their learning outcomes, a 
result supported by several studies (see, for example, Dang and Rogers, 2008; Kang, 
2007). This enhanced academic achievement may also be beneficial to the economy as a 
whole, since the accumulation of human capital increases labor productivity, prompting 
economic growth. Additionally, private tutoring has a positive effect on the labor 
market: in 2009, this sector became the largest employer of graduates in the humanities 
and social sciences (OECD, 2014:95). 
However, various experts conclude that the proliferation of private tutoring can have 
a number of harmful impacts. First, in a highly competitive environment, the health of 
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the country’s pupils is put a risk. This is especially true of students receiving private 
tuition late into the night and on weekends (Rhie et al., 2011). Second, a reliance on 
private tutoring inevitably has some impact on public education. As students are often 
already familiar with the material being taught at school (having already studied it 
privately), the levels of motivation of both students and teachers are negatively affected 
(Choi et al., 2012). Third, a dependence on private tutoring may impede the 
development of students’ self-directed learning and problem-solving abilities (Kim, 
2010:7). Fourth, private tutoring has an opportunity cost which may restrict the 
development of skills and contents beyond those taught at school. 
In addition to these various effects, another serious problem identified by economists 
is that private tutoring gives rise to an issue of efficiency as well as one of equity. First, 
private tutoring activities may generate negative externalities, since students are likely 
to demand more private tutoring services than their optimum level so as to at least 
maintain their relative positions in the academic performance distribution (Kim, 2010). 
As a result, private tutoring may be over-consumed, compared to a socially optimum 
level, despite the fact that the amount of private tutoring consumed by each student is 
individually optimal. As such, the overheated private tutoring market in Korea can be 
explained in the framework of the classic prisoner’s dilemma which leads to a socially 
inefficient equilibrium (Choi, 2010). 
As regards the equity issue, private tutoring is expensive, which means students from 
wealthier families are likely to consume more or higher quality services. Indeed, Korean 
families perceive one-to-one and group tuition – the most expensive types of private 
tutoring – as being the most effective1. All in all, this situation can undermine the 
equality of educational opportunities. Thus, the Korean government has adopted 
different measures over recent decades in an attempt to control private tutoring for 
reasons of both efficiency and equity. 
 
2.2. A testing ground for regulating private tutoring 
 
In 1969, the government effectively ended selective education at the middle school 
level by abolishing entrance examinations. The primary aim was to control what was 
                                                          
1Choi (2008), however, is unable to confirm the greater effectiveness of one-to-one tutoring. His results 
suggest that the effect of private, one-to-one tutoring on college entrance is positive, but statistically 
insignificant.  
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seen as wasteful private tutoring competition among children preparing for entrance 
exams to the most prestigious middle schools (Chung, 2002). For the same motive, in 
1974, the high school equalization policy 2  was implemented in Seoul and Busan, 
Korea’s two largest cities, and subsequently expanded to several other major cities 
through to 1980 (Kim and Lee, 2010). However, contrary to government expectations, 
spending on private tutoring showed no signs of abating. Rather, the equalization policy 
contributed significantly to raising the demand for individualized education (Kang, 
2007), as households turned to private tutoring as a tool to supplement the equalized 
state education system (Kim and Lee, 2010). 
Against this backdrop, in 1980, the Korean government took steps to prohibit all 
forms of private tutoring. However, parents, willing to hire private tutors at any 
expense, turned to the black private to meet their demand. At the same time, the 
suppliers of illegal private services demanded risk premiums, thus increasing further the 
price. Thus, paradoxically, the regulation of private tutoring seems to have exacerbated 
the inequality of educational opportunities by polarizing the consumption of the sector’s 
services. 
The democratization and liberalization of Korea saw the outright ban on private 
tutoring relaxed somewhat. However, until the Constitutional Court ruled that the 
prohibition on private tutoring was indeed unconstitutional in 2000, the government had 
only permitted two types of operator: college students and the hagwon. In the latter 
case, the government imposed strict restrictions in the form of specific requirements 
regarding the qualifications of the instructors, the schools facilities, and fees (Kang, 
2007). Despite this, the number of hagwon increased dramatically from 381 in 1980 to 
14,043 in 2000, while the number of students enrolled at hagwon increased in the same 
period from 118,000 to 1,388,000 (Kim and Lee, 2010). According to National Tax 
Service data, there were nearly 105,000 hagwon operating in Korea by 2013, up from 
92,433 in 2008 (Korean Economic Daily, 2015).  
At the same time, the government has sought to strengthen public education in the 
belief that the gap between the quality of mainstream education and private tutoring 
accounts for the willingness of households to hire private tutoring services. Thus, the 
government has increased inputs to public education substantially in an effort to 
                                                          
2 The high school equalization policy introduced a lottery system whereby students were randomly 
allocated to the public and private schools within a district. As a result, the schools became more 
homogeneous as they could no longer select students and curricula, teacher salaries and tuition fees were 
regulated by the government. 
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improve school facilities, the student-teacher ratio, and the quality of school teachers. 
However, despite the marked increase in government spending, household spending on 
private tutoring has continued to rise at a remarkable pace (Kim and Lee, 2010). 
Since the first decade of the new century, the government has been actively involved 
in providing low-cost substitutes for private tutoring so that demand for the latter could 
be absorbed into the public system. These reforms include the Educational Broadcasting 
System (EBS) lectures that specifically focus on preparing the CSAT, and “after-
school” programs, introduced in 2006, that offer hagwon-like lessons in schools.3 These 
measures, however, did little to cool the demand for private tutoring. As links between 
the EBS lectures and the CSAT intensified (with  many CSAT questions being drawn 
from the EBS lectures), hagwon that specifically focused on the EBS lectures became 
very popular. The “after-school” programs enjoyed some success, especially as they 
provided low-income pupils with additional education opportunities. However, students 
from wealthier backgrounds continued to consume private tutoring services. Indeed, 
some were found to attend both the “after-school” programs and to receive private 
tutorials. According to the 2009-2012 SPEE data, 49.8% of middle and high school 
students whose monthly household income was more than 4 million Korean won both 
received private tutoring and attended the “after-school” programs, while 27.7% of 
them only enrolled for private tutoring. In the case of households with a monthly 
income equal to or below the 4 million won threshold, these figures were 37.5 and 
18.1%, respectively. 
In addition, the government has reformed the university entrance system several 
times, seeking to reduce the importance attached to the CSAT and by introducing 
elements to the admissions system that cannot be acquired by simple memorization. 
Thus, greater importance is now attached to other selection criteria, including high 
school records, essay-style exams, extra-curricular activities, involvement in social 
services, while socio-economic disadvantages are also taken into account. However, 
these reforms have also failed to be effective and have actually ushered in new forms of 
private tutoring that specialize in the enhancement of the new selection criteria (Choi et 
al., 2012). 
 
                                                          
3  These are extra lessons offered by the schools for which students pay a small tuition fee, the 
government meeting the extra-funding needed. Initially, schools were forbidden from signing contracts 
with private institutions to provide these after-school programs. 
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2.3. The 10 p.m. curfew on operating hours of hagwon 
 
As the measures aimed at curbing the demand for private tutoring proved ineffective, 
in 2006 the government introduced a new measure, namely, the regulation 4  of the 
operating hours of hagwon. Before 2006, closing hours in some regions were already 
controlled by local ordinances; however, these curfews had no real authority in law 
(Kang, 2010). In September 2006, the reform of the “Act on the establishment and 
operation of private teaching institutes and extracurricular lessons” strengthened the 
powers of each of the municipal and provincial education offices with regards their 
regulatory authority over the hagwon. By 2009, all the offices had imposed a curfew on 
the operating hours of hagwon. 
In April 2009, Seungjoon Kwak, chairman of the Presidential Council on Future and 
Vision first raised the possibility of fixing the same 10 p.m. curfew for all hagwon. He 
argued that this restriction would help households cut their expenditure on private 
tutoring and safeguard the health of their children. However, the plan faced strong 
opposition from a group of hagwon owners and parents, who claimed that the policy 
would result in many students going to the hagwon in the early morning and on 
weekends, especially as many high schools were keeping pupils at schools until 10 or 
even 11 p.m. (Kang, 2009). Others argued that while the policy might reduce the time 
students spent on private tutoring activities in the hagwon, the demand for private 
tutoring services would simply be substituted by private tutors. In this case, the curfew 
would simply widen the gap between high- and low-income earners, given that the 
former would be able to hire the best private tutors (Bae, 2009). Indeed, a group of 
hagwon operators in Seoul and Busan, with the support of both parents and students 
petitioned the Constitutional Court, claiming that the curfew violated children’s 
educational rights. Despite the opposition, the curfew was declared constitutional by the 
court in October 2009, and the nationwide implementation of the 10 p.m. closure gained 
momentum. That same month, the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology 
reported that the government was expected to urge the amendment of the ordinances of 
the education offices in all cities and provinces and to fix a 10 p.m. curfew. At the same 
time, the government cracked down on those hagwon that violated the curfew, even 
offering financial rewards to citizens who reported offenders. Daegu, Gwangju, and 
                                                          
4 Bray and Kwo (2014) review different types of regulation from a comparative perspective. 
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Gyeonggi revised their ordinances accordingly in 2011, while the rest of the regions 
have been pushing ahead with the reform. As a result, a total of 13 education offices 
have completed or partly completed the revision of their ordinances regulating the 
operating hours of hagwon to 10 p.m. (KEDI, 2012:15-16). Table 1 provides a 
summary, by educational level and Korean province, of recent changes in the closing 
times of hagwon. As can be seen, during the period 2009 to 2012 period, the provinces 
have either maintained or tightened the curfew. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
However, there is little evidence of the effectiveness of the curfews in achieving their 
objectives (i.e., reducing expenditure and the time spent on private tutoring activities). 
To the best of our knowledge, only Kim (2009) has attempted to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the regulation, by applying a panel Tobit model to the 2005-2007 
Korean Education and Employment Panel Survey data, and found a small negative 
impact of the curfew on monthly expenditure and weekly hours spent on private 
tutoring. He did not find any evidence that the regulation significantly increased 
monthly spending on other types of private tutoring. The author specifically analyzed 
the effect of regulating the operating hours of hagwon on household spending on private 
tutoring for general high school students before the enactment of the 10 p.m. curfew. 
Unlike Kim (2009), the present paper, using the more robust methodological framework 
of difference-in-differences, measures the actual impact of the implementation of the 10 
p.m. curfew on private tutoring expenditure by focusing on changes in the curfews that 
have been made since 2009. We also analyze heterogeneous effects by educational 
level, namely, middle school and general high school.  
While the expected impact of the curfew on expenditure and time spent on hagwon is 
trivial (a reduction in both), the overall effect of the measure on expenditure and time 
spent on private tutoring in general remains unclear. As alternative forms of private 
tutoring – most specifically, one-to-one and group tuition – are more expensive, the 
overall effect of the policy will depend on the prevalence of substitution or income 
effect. If admission to the top universities is the main objective driving the demand for 
private tutoring services, we would expect the substitution effect to prevail – i.e., 
families showing a greater willingness to hire additional forms of private tutoring as the 
date for sitting the CSAT approaches. 
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3. Methodology and data  
 
3.1. Methodological approach: Difference-in-Differences (DD) estimation 
 
The intuition behind the difference-in-differences (DD) method is that to investigate 
the effect of a specific intervention (“treatment”), the difference in outcomes after and 
before the intervention for groups affected by that intervention (“treatment groups”) are 
compared with the same difference for unaffected groups (“control groups”) (Bertrand 
et al., 2004:249).  
Given that the curfew policy is not completely exogenous, i.e., some unobserved 
regional-level characteristics may affect both the regulation of the operating hours of the 
hagwon and private tutoring expenditure (our two dependent variables), the error term 
might be correlated with the independent variable. If this is the case, the OLS estimator 
is biased. However, under certain assumptions, the DD method allows us to at least 
control for the unobserved regional-level characteristics that are fixed over time, thus 
removing a potentially large source of omitted variable bias. By including group-level 
fixed effects, the DD method can control for such unobserved group-level variables 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009:227). This applies to the current study, where the variable of 
interest operates at the regional level. The DD approach can control for time-invariant 
regional-level characteristics by comparing private tutoring expenditure costs and the 
time spent on private tutoring activities within regions over time and shared time trends 
by comparing differences across regions. 
However, the credibility of this approach relies on a set of assumptions. First, the 
parallel trend assumption needs to hold in order for a DD estimator to yield a consistent 
estimate of the treatment effect; that is, in the absence of the treatment, private tutoring 
expenditure trends would have been the same in both treatment and control groups. This 
is analyzed graphically (Table A.1 in the Appendix). Results seem to confirm this 
assumption for high school students (Table A.1 b and d): the average weekly hours and 
yearly expenditure dedicated to private tutoring in the treatment and control groups 
followed a parallel evolution between 2009 and 2010 (prior to the enforcement of the 
hagwon curfew). This assumption does not seem to hold as strongly for middle school 
students (Table A.1 a and c). Thus, the results for middle school students have to be 
interpreted with caution and our analysis focuses primarily on the findings for high 
school students.   
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A second issue is that the DD estimator is inconsistent if an Ashenfelter dip occurs. 
The Ashenfelter dip indicates that treated individuals might have suffered bad outcomes 
immediately prior to treatment assignment due either to the selection of individuals or 
an anticipation of their participation in the treatment. However, here, anticipation of the 
implementation of the curfew did not result in parents increasing their private tutoring 
expenditure immediately prior to the imposition of the stricter curfew. 
Finally, the DD estimates would be biased if the composition of the treatment and 
control groups changed as a result of the treatment. This would only be a problem here 
if households moved between regions in search of less strict curfews on the operating 
hours of hagwon in order to consume more private tutoring services. However, there is 
no evidence of Korean families having increased their geographical mobility after 2009. 
Indeed, our results seem to indicate that families adopted other strategies for countering 
the effects of the curfew. 
As discussed above, by 2009 the provincial education offices around the country had 
fixed their own curfew on the hagwon. However, some of them changed this restriction 
in 2011 and 2012. This makes it appropriate to exploit a DD estimator to investigate the 
effect of the regulation on private tutoring expenditure. The treated group comprises 
those regions that modified their curfew between 2009 and 2012. Thus, the treatment 
considered in this study is not exactly the imposition of the 10 p.m. curfew, but rather 
the further strengthening of existing curfews (Table 1). The fact that the treatment (the 
curfew time) even differs within a region, led us to split the analysis between middle 
and general high school students, the main consumers of private tutoring in Korea. 
Control groups are identified, for each educational level, as those regions in which the 
hagwon closing times remained constant during the period.  
Table 1 provides a summary of the curfews fixed by each education office. Based on 
the previous discussion, seven treatment groups are identified for middle school 
students and four for high school students. In 2011, the Jeonnam education office 
changed its curfew from midnight to 11:50 p.m. for high school students. However, a 
ten-minute difference is not expected to have a significant effect on private tutoring 
expenditure, so Jeonnam is categorized as a control group for high school students.  
The timing of the implementation of the reforms posed an additional challenge for the 
identification of the treatment. As described in subsection 3.2 below, the data used in 
this analysis were drawn from a survey completed by parents twice a year. The problem 
is that some regional reforms were implemented during one of these reference periods: 
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the first being from March to May and the second from July to September. For example, 
in the cases of Gangwon, which introduced a change on 30 March 2012, and Daejeon, 
which imposed an initial curfew on 10 April 2009, including these regions in the 
analysis might have influenced the results and so they were dropped from the analysis. 
As a result, we are left with five treatment groups for middle school students (Daegu, 
Incheon, Jeonnam, Jeju, and Gyeonggi) and four treatment groups for high school 
students (Daegu, Incheon, Gyeonggi, and Gwangju). It should also be borne in mind 
that the enforcement of the curfews also differs across regions and school levels.  
Given the existence of multiple groups and time periods, we opted to employ the 
general framework suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004:250) in which DD estimates and 
their standard errors derive from using OLS in repeated cross-sections of data on 
individuals in both treatment and control groups for several years before and after a 
specific intervention. The equation at the individual level is 
 
(1)        
 
where  is the outcome of interest for individual i in region r in year t (private 
tutoring expenditure –in log terms- or hours devoted to private tutoring);  is a full set 
of region dummies;  is a full set of year dummies;  is individual-specific 
covariates (gender, dummies for household income, dummies for parents’ educational 
attainment, dummies for parents’ age, dummies for parents’ economic activity 
participation, and dummies for size of the region);  is an indicator as to whether the 
curfew is further strengthened in region r in year t; and  is an error term. The region 
fixed effects  capture any time-invariant difference in outcomes between the 
treatment and control groups, while the year fixed effects  capture how both groups 
are affected over time by any non-treatment forces (Slaughter, 2001:210). Our 
dependent variables take a zero value for a large number of households5. Following 
Tansel and Bircan (2006), we obtain consistent estimates using a tobit framework which 
controls for the censored nature of the data. Following the argument of Bertrand et al. 
(2004), we compute robust standard errors to prevent overestimation of t-statistics and 
                                                          
5 In our sample, 41.3% of the middle and high school students do not take any kind of private tutoring. 
For one-to-one private tutoring and hagwon private tutoring, those figures are 85.4% and 57.9%, 
respectively. 
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significance levels. The DD estimator  can be interpreted as the effect of the 
enforcement of a curfew on operating hours of hagwon on private tutoring expenditure/ 
hours spent on private tutoring activities. 
Since curfews differ across school levels, the sample is divided into two subsamples: 
middle school and general high school students. The same estimation model is applied 
to both subsamples. Vocational high school students are excluded from the sample, as 
their academic profile and private tutoring consumption patterns differ significantly 
from students following the academic path6. Primary school students are excluded from 
the analysis too, as the consumption of private tutoring is mainly concentrated at higher 
educational levels.  
Additionally, in the last part of our analysis, we split the high school sample into two 
(high- and low-income households) to check for the existence of heterogeneous effects 
of the curfew on the time and money spent on different types of tutoring. This exercise 
allows us to provide a clear picture of the redistributive effects of the curfew.  
 
3.2. Data 
 
This paper employs the Survey on Private Education Expenditure (SPEE) conducted 
since 2007 by the Korean National Statistics Office (KOSTAT). It provides detailed 
information on the consumption of private education services by Korean students (time 
spent, expenditure, type of tutoring). The survey is answered twice a year (June and 
October) by 46,000 parents of students attending 1,081 elementary, middle, and high 
schools across the country.  
Students at each school level are selected by a stratification procedure designed to be 
representative of the national population at that school level. More specifically, after 
stratifying schools into four levels (elementary, middle, general and vocational high 
school) and 16 cities and provinces, the schools are independently sampled by grades. 
For elementary school, grades are stratified into 1~3 grades and 4~6 grades, and then 
three classes are randomly chosen per school. For middle and high schools, one class is 
sampled per school (KOSTAT, 2011). 
We use data from 2009 to 2012. The rationale behind this choice is that, since 2009, 
KOSTAT provides information by administrative district, which constitutes crucial 
                                                          
6 Choi et al. (2012) discuss the different profile of vocational high school students. 
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information for performing the DD estimation, as each administrative district has its 
own education office and hagwon operating hours differ from one office to another. 
Thus, the availability of information for each administrative district facilitates the 
analysis of the impact of changes in the hagwon curfew on private tutoring expenses. 
Several regions that implemented amendments to the ordinance during the reference 
periods of the survey are excluded from the sample. They include Daejeon and Jeonbuk, 
which enacted their initial curfews during the 2009 reference periods, and Gangwon and 
Chungnam, which changed their curfews during the 2012 reference periods. As a result, 
we work with a sample of 190,276 middle and general high school students7, from an 
overall sample of 349,365 students. 
The dataset provides detailed information about the number of hours dedicated to 
private tutoring and the corresponding expenditure on these services. Private tutoring 
expenditure is reported for each subject (Korean, English, math, and science) and for 
each tutoring type (i.e., one-to-one tuition, group tuition, hagwon lessons, use of 
textbook combined with visit from a tutor, and paid internet and correspondence lecture 
tuition). All the variables concerning expenditure are expressed in real terms, adjusted 
to 2010 prices using a consumer price index.  
The dataset contains information on student characteristics (gender and academic 
performance in class), household characteristics (monthly household income, parents’ 
education level, age and economic activity participation), and the size of the region in 
which the household resides. These variables, except for academic performance in class 
(due to the potential problem of endogeneity8), are included in the regression model as 
individual-specific covariates. Treatment variables are identified as follows. A 
regulation dummy is assigned a value of one for regions and time periods subject to the 
policy strengthening the initial curfew on hagwon. Since the identification of treatment 
groups differs according to school level, these regulation dummies are created for each 
school level. Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix summarize the definitions and the 
main descriptive statistics, respectively, of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Table A.3 presents the mean values of the main variables in each sample. The first 
column shows the overall mean for all students, while columns two and three report the 
means for middle and general high school students. The fourth and fifth columns 
                                                          
7 A student who reported that her average weekly hours spent on private tutoring for academic purpose 
was 80 hours was dropped from the analysis as it is clearly an abnormal value.  
    8  Nevertheless, main results remained unchanged when introducing previous performance in the 
analysis.  
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compare student characteristics according to whether they receive private tutoring or not. 
Compared to high school students, middle school students spend more time and more 
money on private tutoring. Moreover, their consumption of private tutoring seems to be 
heavily concentrated on hagwon tutoring, while high school students also spend a 
significant amount of money on private, one-to-one tuition (with high school students 
spending almost twice as much as middle school students).  
While classes at the hagwon are the most popular form of private tutoring, the use of 
textbook and internet and correspondence lectures are the least frequently used methods. 
SPEE data show a positive correlation between household income and time spent on 
one-to-one tuition, suggesting that this method is considered the most effective for 
improving pupils’ academic performance. However, to the best of our knowledge, no 
analyses of the heterogeneous effects of tuition methods on academic achievement have 
yet been performed. 
More interestingly, there are systematic differences in student characteristics 
depending on whether or not they receive private tutoring. In general, those receiving 
private tutoring are likely to be female, high academic achievers, and from high socio-
economic backgrounds (Table A.3). The positive correlation between students’ 
achievement and the consumption of private tutoring indicates that the primary 
objective of such tuition in Korea is not to complement deficient academic achievement, 
but rather it constitutes a strategy for high academic performers to maintain and 
strengthen their competitive advantage. This finding is in line with previous studies, see 
for example, Kim (2007) and Kim (2009). In the case of students’ socio-economic 
backgrounds, the fourth and fifth columns of Table A.3 indicate that the proportion of 
students whose parents have at least a university degree and the proportion of students 
whose monthly household income is more than 4 million won are substantially higher 
among students that receive private tutoring than those who do not. These figures 
clearly demonstrate that households with high socio-economic status tend to provide 
their children with additional educational opportunities in the form of private tutoring.  
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
We present the average treatment effects of regulating the operating hours of hagwon 
on the time devoted to private tutoring (Subsection 4.1) and on expenditure dedicated to 
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these activities (4.2). The article concludes with a discussion of the study’s main 
findings (4.3). 
  
4.1. The impact of the hagwon curfew on the time dedicated to private tutoring activities 
  
Table 2 presents the average treatment effect of the regulation of the operating hours 
of hagwon on the number of hours dedicated to all kinds of private tutoring activities. 
The non-significant coefficients clearly show that the curfew failed to reduce the time 
spent on private tutoring activities both for middle and high school students. There are 
two potential explanations for this finding: first that the policy failed to cut the time 
dedicated to classes offered by hagwon. This being the case, it could simply be 
concluded that the policy was ineffective. Second, the policy might have succeeded in 
reducing the amount of time spent on hagwon classes, but that this reduction was 
completely or partly offset by an increase in the consumption of other types of private 
tutoring. Although the SPEE does not provide details regarding the amount of time 
spent on each type of private tutoring activity, the results in subsection 4.2 seem to 
support this second scenario. 
  
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
  
The coefficients of the control variables are consistent with results reported in most 
previous studies. Students from higher income households and whose parents record a 
higher educational attainment tend to invest more time in private tuition. It has also 
been shown that students in households where the father is the sole breadwinner spend 
more time on private tutoring than their counterparts do. This may be attributed to the 
fact that the fathers in such households tend to have well-paid job9 and stay-at-home 
mothers can spend more time and energy on taking care of the educational activities of 
their children. These results suggest that educational expectations of parents vary 
according to their level of education and the importance of budgetary constraints on 
their being able to participate in private tutoring activities. This should be borne in mind 
when analyzing the next set of results (4.2).  
                                                          
9 According to the SPEE from 2009 to 2012, the average monthly household income is slightly higher 
for double-income families, but the average monthly household income per earner is much higher for 
single-income families with the father as the only breadwinner. This implies that some of the fathers in 
such households have a well-paid job, enough not to need an extra income earner in their households. 
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4.2. The impact of the hagwon curfew on spending on private tutoring activities 
  
Table 3 presents the average treatment effect of the hagwon curfew on total private 
tutoring expenditure (first and fourth columns). We also calculate the impact of the 
curfew on private, one-to-one and group tuition expenditure and on hagwon tutoring 
expenditure separately, in order to identify the existence of a substitution effect. The 
main finding reported in Table 3 is that the enforcement of the curfew did not 
significantly reduce total expenditure on private tuition. As expected, the curfew was 
successful in decreasing expenditure on hagwon tutoring for both middle and high 
school students. This reduction in spending was greater for high school students, 
suggesting that the policy has had a greater impact on high school students, who are 
more likely to stay late at school. 
   
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
  
In the case of expenditure on private, one-to-one and group tuition (two more 
expensive substitutes for hagwon tutoring), the coefficients are insignificant for both 
school types. However, a positive, albeit statistically non-significant coefficient, for 
high school students seems to suggest that the reduction in spending on hagwon classes 
might have led to an increase in consumption of other private tutoring activities (i.e., 
private, one-to-one and group tuition). 
The coefficients presented by the father’s and mother’s education, along with the 
household income dummies (Table 3) also indicate that yearly spending on private 
tutoring is significantly and positively correlated to household income and parental 
education. Indeed, the patterns followed by the socio-economic status variables are 
similar to those found when the dependent variable is the number of hours spent on 
private tutoring (Table 2). Households in which the father is a single-income earner 
spend the most amount of money on private tutoring activities. 
 
4.3. Discussion 
 
The DD estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the enforcement of the 
hagwon curfew did not significantly reduce the total time and expenditure dedicated to 
private tutoring as was intended, and that the government intervention was only 
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successful in reducing hagwon tutoring costs. This seems to be in line with the second 
scenario proposed in subsection 4.1 in which the reduced consumption of hagwon 
tuition driven by the curfew is completely or partially replaced by the increase in 
consumption of other types of private tutoring, including private, one-to-one and group 
tuition.   
This substitution effect seems to be stronger among high school students. The impact 
of the regulation on one-to-one and group tuition for middle school students is not very 
different from zero (Table 3). However, the same estimate for high school students is 
0.177, very similar to the decrease in expenditure on hagwon tutoring, although the 
value is statistically insignificant. 
To obtain a clearer picture of the substitution effect across tuition types, we checked 
for the existence of heterogeneous effects. Table 4 shows the heterogeneous effects by 
household income of the hagwon curfew on time and money spent on private tutoring 
for high school students. In the table, the whole sample of high school students is 
divided into two groups: students from families whose monthly household income is 
above or below the 4 million won threshold10. Neither group of high school students 
reduces the total number of hours nor expenditure dedicated to private tuition, which 
suggests these effects are not heterogeneous across different income groups. However, 
if we examine the way in which the enforcement of the hagwon curfew has influenced 
private, one-to-one and group tuition and hagwon tutoring, we see that the two groups 
reacted quite differently to the intervention. The first row in Table 4 shows that high 
school students from low-income households significantly increased their consumption 
of private, one-to-one and group tuition when they had to reduce significantly their 
consumption of hagwon tutoring. This is clear evidence that the substitution from 
private hagwon tutoring to private, one-to-one and group tuition was more intense 
among lower income high school students. Conversely, high school students from high-
income families did not seem to be as greatly affected by the intervention (given that all 
of the coefficients are insignificant despite showing the same signs as for the other 
group).  
  
                                                          
10 There are 8 income groups in the SPEE dataset (see table A.2). The monthly household income of 
the lowest 4 groups is less than 4 million wons and that of the highest 4 groups is more than 4 million 
wons. Also, given that the average monthly household income was about 4.4 million wons in 2014 
(Korea Statistics), the use of 4 million wons as a threshold is considered reasonable. Disgracefully, the 
SPEE does not allow estimating per student expenditure and we acknowledge this limitation. 
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INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE  
  
How can we explain the heterogeneous reactions of the two types of household to the 
policy and what are the consequences of these heterogeneous effects? Our results show 
that the demand of high school students for private tutoring is inelastic, given that they 
are likely to regard private tutoring services as indispensable for excelling on the CSAT, 
the critical point in their academic lives. Thus, when their consumption of hagwon 
tutoring was regulated by the policy intervention, a considerable number of high school 
students appear to have opted to increase their use of private, one-to-one and group 
tuition to offset the reduction in hagwon classes. More specifically, this substitution 
across types of tuition is driven mainly by high school students from low-income 
families, those traditionally more reliant on the private classes offered by hagwon. In 
contrast, high school students from high-income families have, in addition to being 
consumers of hagwon tutoring, been active buyers of other types of private tuition. In 
other words, given that their consumption of private tutoring services had already 
shown an inclination for one-to-one and group tuition, regulations on the supply of 
hagwon did not affect their choice as much. 
Finally, we checked the robustness of these results by performing a placebo test. In 
this test, we simulated the enforcement of the hagwon curfew as if it had been 
introduced between 2009 and 2010, that is, one year before actual enforcement. This 
analysis was replicated both for the whole sample of high school students and for the 
high-income and low-income households separately. Results are reported in Table 5 and, 
as expected, no significant effects were found. 
  
INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
  
The imposition of the hagwon curfew has been more successful in changing private 
tutoring consumption patterns than in reducing the total time dedicated to private 
tutoring and the resources spent on these activities. This raises issues of both efficiency 
and equity. In the case of efficiency, while families managed to reduce their 
consumption of hagwon – a foreseeable outcome, given the nature of the regulations, 
their children increased the amount of time – and money – spent on other, more 
expensive, types of private tuition. The policy failed therefore to achieve its main 
objective – reducing the consumption of private tutoring – due to the inelastic demand 
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of such tutoring, closely linked to the overheated competition for admission to the most 
prestigious universities. The impact of the curfew on efficiency therefore depends on 
the effectiveness of each private tuition type for transmitting skills and, ultimately, the 
impact of these skills on economic growth. While examining this question is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it should be highlighted that if there are differences in quality 
between types of private tuition, the change in consumption patterns may have an 
impact on efficiency. Additionally, the impact of the curfew on efficiency is closely 
linked to its distributional effects. 
Hence, an increase in the consumption of more expensive private tuition by low- 
income families may raise the overall performance of these students – that is, if the 
assumption of “superior quality” holds. Moreover, marginal gains in academic 
performance may prove to be crucial in an ultra-competitive environment. However, the 
substitution process generated by the curfew also has its losers, namely, the low-income 
families that paid for hagwon tutoring but who cannot afford other types of tuition. 
Therefore, as previous studies suggest that receiving private tuition has a positive 
impact on academic performance, the regulation has a negative impact on the equality 
of educational opportunities among this last subgroup of students. 
To conclude, the Korean experience should serve to provide relevant guidelines for 
policymakers in countries with large private tutoring markets. The first lesson is 
straightforward: regulating – and effectively controlling – the operating hours of 
educational institutions has an impact on the consumption of the services provided by 
those institutions. However, the aggregate effect of these measures on the consumption 
of private tutoring is difficult to predict, as it seems to depend on the elasticity of 
demand of educational services, the existence of substitute services and the profile of 
the consumers of the different types of private tuition. Imposing a curfew on the 
academies in Korea had a neutral effect on the overall consumption of private tutoring 
because of the inelastic demand for these activities and the existence of substitute 
services. Moreover, the Korean authorities learnt decades ago that efforts to ban or 
regulate one-to-one tuition lead to an increase in black market activities. Therefore, 
policymakers who seek to cool the demand for private tutoring should perhaps focus 
their attention on tackling the underlying causes of the overheated demand for education, 
since the proliferation of private tutoring is usually the symptom of more complex 
issues. 
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Table 1 
Curfew imposed on hagwon, 2009-2012  
  Middle school closing times (p.m.)  High school closing times (p.m.) 
Region 2009 2010 2011 2012  2009 2010 2011 2012 
Daegu 12 12 10 10  12 12 10 10 Gyeonggi 11 11 10 10  12 12 10 10 Incheon 12 12 12 10  12 12 12 11 Jeonnam 12 12 10 10  12 12  12
a  12a 
Jeju 12 12 12 11  12 12 12 12 Gwangju 10 10 10 10  12 12 10 10 
Seoul 10 10 10 10  10 10 10 10 Busan 10 10 10 10  11 11 11 11 Ulsan 12 12 12 12  12 12 12 12 Chungbuk  11 11 11 11  12 12 12 12 Gyeongbuk 11 11 11 11  12 12 12 12 Gyeongnam 12 12 12 12  12 12 12 12 
Gangwon 12 12 12 11  12 12 12 12 
Chungnam  12 12 12 11  12 12 12 12 
Daejeon 11 11 11 11  12 12 12 12 
Jeonbuk 11 11 11 11  11 11 11 11 
Source: Ordinance regarding the establishment and operation of private teaching institutes and 
extracurricular lessons specified on the website of each city and provincial education office. Numbers in 
bold: change in curfew. Regions in bold: those whose reforms were implemented during survey periods 
(excluded from the analysis). a The exact curfew for Jeonnam is 11:50 p.m.  
  
.  
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 Table 2 
Effects of the enforcement of the curfew on hours spent on private tutoring 
VARIABLES Middle school High school 
Regulation 0.011 -0.081 
 (0.126) (0.101) 
Female -0.353*** 0.336*** 
 (0.065) (0.049) 
Father’s education   
  High school 1.988*** 0.813*** 
 (0.235) (0.154) 
  Undergraduate 2.930*** 1.878*** 
 (0.242) (0.160) 
  Graduate school 2.823*** 2.085*** 
 (0.267) (0.179) 
Mother’s education   
  High school 0.938*** 0.697*** 
 (0.228) (0.146) 
  Undergraduate 1.182*** 1.254*** 
 (0.239) (0.155) 
  Graduate school 1.300*** 1.612*** 
 (0.296) (0.201) 
Household income   
  1~2 million won 2.059*** 1.443*** 
 (0.264) (0.217) 
2~3 million won 5.016*** 3.368*** 
 (0.257) (0.211) 
3~4 million won 6.750*** 4.780*** 
 (0.256) (0.211) 
4~5 million won 7.451*** 5.516*** 
 (0.260) (0.213) 
5~6 million won 7.989*** 6.250*** 
 (0.265) (0.218) 
6~7 million won 8.569*** 6.795*** 
 (0.279) (0.227) 
More than 7 million won 8.810*** 7.059*** 
 (0.268) (0.219) 
Father’s age   
40s 0.628*** 0.694* 
 (0.189) (0.402) 
  50s 0.249 0.262 
 (0.216) (0.405) 
Mother’s age    
  40s -0.257*** 0.503*** 
 (0.097) (0.148) 
  50s -0.150 0.753*** 
 (0.202) (0.173) 
Economic activity participation   
  Mother only -1.831*** -1.307*** 
 (0.181) (0.138) 
  Both -0.339*** -0.709*** 
 (0.068) (0.0518) 
  None -4.909*** -2.399*** 
 (0.358) (0.303) 
Size of region   
Metropolitan city 0.782** -4.538*** 
 (0.354) (0.333) 
Small city 1.736*** -3.211*** 
 (0.195) (0.136) 
Rural area 0.289 -5.710*** 
 (0.213) (0.163) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes 
Observations 70,176 107,409 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 
Effects of the enforcement of the curfew on private tutoring expenditure 
 Middle school High school 
VARIABLES Expenditure 1:1/Group Hagwon Expenditure 1:1/Group Hagwon 
Regulation -0.037 0.002 -0.127* -0.083 0.177 -0.197** 
 (0.053) (0.151) (0.073) (0.065) (0.129) (0.095) 
Female -0.025 0.190** -0.170*** 0.462*** 1.023*** 0.157*** 
 (0.027) (0.078) (0.037) (0.032) (0.063) (0.046) 
Father’s education       
High school 1.022*** 2.009*** 0.953*** 0.593*** 0.986*** 0.594*** 
 (0.101) (0.305) (0.131) (0.103) (0.206) (0.149) 
  Undergraduate 1.578*** 2.972*** 1.561*** 1.366*** 1.807*** 1.443*** 
 (0.104) (0.313) (0.135) (0.107) (0.213) (0.154) 
  Graduate school 1.587*** 3.198*** 1.670*** 1.563*** 2.051*** 1.746*** 
 (0.113) (0.339) (0.150) (0.118) (0.236) (0.171) 
Mother’s education       
  High school 0.390*** 0.415 0.428*** 0.488*** 0.763*** 0.363*** 
 (0.098) (0.290) (0.129) (0.098) (0.195) (0.140) 
  Undergraduate 0.640*** 1.514*** 0.540*** 0.929*** 1.545*** 0.864*** 
 (0.102) (0.302) (0.135) (0.104) (0.207) (0.149) 
 Graduate school 0.803*** 1.822*** 0.663*** 1.199*** 2.145*** 0.806*** 
 (0.122) (0.367) (0.169) (0.129) (0.257) (0.192) 
Household income       
  1~2 million won 0.846*** 0.853** 1.033*** 1.042*** 1.313*** 1.227*** 
 (0.117) (0.349) (0.153) (0.144) (0.306) (0.209) 
2~3 million won 2.228*** 2.844*** 2.520*** 2.416*** 3.197*** 2.597*** 
 (0.113) (0.336) (0.148) (0.140) (0.296) (0.203) 
3~4 million won 3.051*** 4.361*** 3.431*** 3.412*** 4.991*** 3.417*** 
 (0.112) (0.334) (0.148) (0.140) (0.294) (0.203) 
4~5 million won 3.472*** 5.640*** 3.768*** 3.946*** 5.968*** 3.698*** 
 (0.114) (0.336) (0.150) (0.141) (0.296) (0.205) 
5~6 million won 3.726*** 6.442*** 3.962*** 4.389*** 6.876*** 4.062*** 
 (0.116) (0.342) (0.154) (0.143) (0.301) (0.209) 
6~7 million won 3.930*** 6.884*** 4.181*** 4.787*** 7.531*** 4.320*** 
 (0.120) (0.357) (0.161) (0.148) (0.311) (0.217) 
More than 7 
million won 
3.992*** 7.528*** 4.104*** 4.828*** 8.165*** 4.195*** 
(0.117) (0.343) (0.156) (0.143) (0.300) (0.209) 
Father’s age       
40s 0.276*** 0.264 0.418*** 0.496* 0.089 1.024** 
 (0.079) (0.228) (0.108) (0.270) (0.505) (0.402) 
  50s 0.087 -0.087 0.274** 0.244 -0.202 0.606 
 (0.091) (0.259) (0.123) (0.272) (0.510) (0.405) 
Mother’s age        
  40s -0.009 0.276** -0.076 0.325*** 0.453** 0.209 
 (0.040) (0.117) (0.055) (0.098) (0.190) (0.143) 
  50s 0.127 0.583** -0.078 0.524*** 0.832*** 0.284* 
 (0.085) (0.242) (0.114) (0.114) (0.221) (0.165) 
Economic activity        
  Mother only -0.919*** -0.938*** -0.962*** -0.860*** -0.818*** -1.180*** 
 (0.079) (0.218) (0.104) (0.091) (0.179) (0.130) 
  Both -0.293*** -0.919*** -0.202*** -0.472*** -0.452*** -0.697*** 
 (0.028) (0.082) (0.039) (0.033) (0.066) (0.049) 
  None -2.379*** -2.736*** -2.476*** -1.624*** -1.589*** -2.089*** 
 (0.160) (0.433) (0.205) (0.201) (0.390) (0.292) 
Size of region       
Metropolitan city 0.368** 2.435*** -0.429** -2.008*** 1.331*** -5.347*** 
 (0.149) (0.460) (0.200) (0.223) (0.466) (0.308) 
Small city 0.475*** 0.618*** 0.133 -1.279*** 0.436** -2.981*** 
 (0.075) (0.223) (0.108) (0.091) (0.173) (0.137) 
Rural area -0.105 0.685*** -0.851*** -3.116*** -0.787*** -6.182*** 
 (0.086) (0.246) (0.122) (0.109) (0.205) (0.168) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70176 70176 70176 107409 107409 107409 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 
Heterogeneous effects by household income of the enforcement of the curfew on time 
and money spent in private tutoring by high school students. 
VARIABLES Hour Expenditure 1:1/Group Hagwon 
Low-income households -0.107 -0.077 0.347* -0.255* 
(Less than 4 million won) (0.149) (0.104) (0.210) (0.143) 
High-income households 0.044 -0.016 0.257 -0.084 
(More than 4 million won) (0.172) (0.100) (0.198) (0.156) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 5 
Results of a placebo enforcement of the curfew on time and money spent on private 
tutoring by high school students. 
VARIABLES Hour Expenditure 1:1/Group Hagwon 
All -0.017 -0.113 -0.069 -0.159 
 (0.115) (0.073) (0.146) (0.109) 
Low-income households -0.005 -0.059 0.001 -0.201 
(Less than 4 million won) (0.167) (0.114) (0.234) (0.160) 
High-income households -0.056 -0.127 -0.039 -0.131 
(More than 4 million won) (0.201) (0.113) (0.231) (0.183) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.1 
Parallel trend assumption 
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Table A.2 
Definition of main variables  
Variables Definition 
Hour Weekly hours spent on private tutoring for academic purpose 
Expenditure Yearly spending on private tutoring for academic purpose 
One-to-one tutoring Yearly spending on 'one-to-one tutoring' 
Group tutoring Yearly spending on 'group tutoring' 
Hagwon tutoring Yearly spending on 'taking lessons at hagwon' 
Workbook tutoring Yearly spending on 'textbooks with tutor's visit' type tutoring 
Internet tutoring Yearly spending on 'paid internet and correspondence lectures' 
type tutoring Female 1 if female; 0 otherwise 
Father’s education (The reference group is middle school degree of less) 
  High school 1 if father has a high school degree; 0 otherwise 
  University 1 if father has a university degree; 0 otherwise 
  Graduate school 1 if father has a graduate degree or more; 0 otherwise 
Mother’s education (The reference group is middle school degree or less) 
  High school 1 if mother has a high school degree; 0 otherwise 
  University 1 if mother has a university degree; 0 otherwise 
  Graduate school 1 if mother has a graduate degree or more; 0 otherwise 
Household income (The reference group is less than 1 million won) 
  1~2 million won 1 if monthly household income is between 1~2 million won; 0 
otherwise   2~3 million won 1 if monthly household income is between 2~3 million won; 0 
otherwise   3~4 million won 1 if monthly household income is between 3~4 million won; 0 
otherwise   4~5 million won 1 if monthly household income is between 4~5 million won; 0 
otherwise   5~6 million won 1 if monthly household income is between 5~6 million won; 0 
otherwise   6~7 million won 1 if monthly household income is between 6~7 million won; 0 
otherwise   More than 7 million won 1 if monthly household income is more than 7 million won; 0 
otherwise Father’s age (T e reference group is father in his twenties or thirties) 
  40s 1 if father is in his forties; 0 otherwise 
  50s 1 if father is in his fifties; 0 otherwise 
Mother’s age (The reference group is mother in her twenties or thirties) 
  40s 1 if mother is in her forties; 0 otherwise 
  50s 1 if mother is in her fifties; 0 otherwise 
Economic activity 
participation  
(The reference group is only father works) 
  Mother only 1 if only mother works; 0 otherwise 
  Both 1 if both father and mother work; 0 otherwise 
  None 1 if neither father nor mother works; 0 otherwise 
Academic performance (The reference group is top 10% of the class) 
  10~30% 1 if student is between 10~30% of the class; 0 otherwise 
  30~60% 1 if student is between 30~60% of the class; 0 otherwise 
  60~80% 1 if student is between 60~80% of the class; 0 otherwise 
  Bottom 20% 1 if student is below bottom 20% of the class; 0 otherwise 
Size of the region (The reference group is Seoul) 
  Metropolitan city 1 if metropolitan city; 0 otherwise 
  Small city 1 if small city; 0 otherwise 
  Rural area 1 if rural area; 0 otherwise 
Regulation  1 if the strengthened curfew is implemented; 0 otherwise 
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Table A.3 
Descriptives 
 Mean  
 
Variables 
All 
 
Students 
Middle 
School 
Students 
High 
school 
students 
No  
Tutoring 
(Hour = 0) 
Positive 
Tutoring 
(Hour > 0) 
Hour 4.991  6.924 3.707  0  8.495 
Expenditure 278.110  296.578  265.835 0  473.340 
One-to-one tutoring 68.004  46.752  82.129  0  115.742 
  Group tutoring 32.118  30.488  33.201  0  54.665  
  Hagwon tutoring 168.35  207.095  142.656  0  286.590  
  Workbook tutoring 3.794  8.083  0.943  0  6.458  
  Internet tutoring 5.808  4.159  6.904  0  9.885  
Female 0.477  0.472  0.481  0.462  0.488  
Father’s education      Middle school or less 0.051 0.049 0.051 0.086 0.026 
  High school 0.432  0.441  0.426  0.517  0.372  
  University 0.441  0.441  0.441  0.350  0.507  
  Graduate school 0.076 0.069  0.081  0.047  0.095  
Mother’s education        Middle school or less 0.054 0.050 0.058 0.087 0.032 
  High school 0.575  0.569  0.578  0.643  0.528  
  University 0.342  0.355  0.334  0.253  0.403  
  Graduate school 0.029  0.026  0.030  0.017  0.037  
Household income        Less than 1 million won 0.049 0.058 0.043 0.089 0.022 
  1~2 million won 0.138  0.143  0.134  0.211  0.086  
  2~3 million won 0.204  0.205  0.204  0.242  0.178  
  3~4 million won 0.214  0.213  0.215  0.196  0.226  
  4~5 million won 0.156  0.153  0.159  0.119  0.182  
  5~6 million won 0.098  0.094  0.100  0.064  0.122  
  6~7 million won 0.050  0.049  0.050  0.028  0.065  
  More than 7 million won 0.091  0.085  0.095  0.051  0.119  
Economic activity participation        Father only 0.359 0.372 0.351 0.328 0.381 
  Mother only 0.085 0.087 0.083 0.123 0.058 
  Both  0.538 0.518 0.552 0.519 0.552 
  None 0.018 0.023 0.014 0.030 0.009 
Academic performance        Top 10% 0.109 0.116 0.102 0.067 0.137 
  10~30% 0.208  0.215  0.204  0.148  0.250  
  30~60% 0.332  0.309  0.347  0.308  0.349  
  60~80% 0.216  0.210  0.221  0.266  0.182  
Bottom 20% 0.135  0.150  0.126  0.211  0.082  
Number of observations 190,276 75,973 114,303 78,480 111,796 
Note: All the variables regarding private tutoring expenditure are presented in 10 thousands of Korean 
won. 
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